Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. 
up to 150 corpses being found daily in Baghdad. 1 The government of Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki was viewed by almost everyone as ineffective at best, and the U.S. military strategy was not well defined and clearly not working. Iraq appeared to be sliding out of control toward civil war or disintegration, and the United States appeared to be headed inexorably toward defeatanother Vietnam. Popular sentiment held that the best course of action was to cut our losses and disengage from a fight we were losing. General George Casey, USA, the outgoing commander of MNF-I, had supported a gradual drawdown of U.S. forces and a handoff of security tasks to
Iraqi forces even as the situation got worse. 
The General
It is common knowledge that General Petraeus is an atypical military officer and that he has had an unusual career in the Army since graduating from West Point in 1974. Without going into the details and chronology of that career, it is worth noting some highlights that made him stand out from his peers. First was his unequalled record of success in whatever he has done. Examples are his winning all three leadership awards in his class at the U.S. Army Ranger School, arguably the toughest training the Army has to offer; his top-ranking in his class at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, even though he was one of the most junior officers in the class; and his completion of both a Masters in Public Administration and a Ph.D.
in international relations from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.
Second was working directly for and learning from some of the Army's best strategic leaders. These assignments included being the aide to General John Galvin when the general com- What further makes General Petraeus unusual are his personal characteristics. He has been described as "the most competitive man on the planet. " 6 He drives himself to succeed at every endeavor, and he usually manages to best everyone else. That competitiveness is evident in physical fitness. The general maintains an extremely high level of fitness, reveling in running Soldiers half his age into the ground, and beating them in push-up or sit-up contests. When asked how many push-ups, sit-ups, or ankles-to-the-bar he can do, his usual response is, "One more than you!" 7 Twice, he had serious accidents: first, he was accidentally shot in the chest by a
Soldier during a live-fire training exercise, and second, he broke his pelvis in multiple places in a skydiving accident. In both cases, he demonstrated incredible recuperative powers, returning to full activity much earlier than anticipated. 8 General Petraeus also has a high level of strategic thinking skills developed and honed by the strategic leaders he has served as well as his broadening experiences at Princeton. He has described his time there as the most important developmental years of his career because of his exposure to an environment where most people thought differently than he did. It broadened his perspective and helped him better get outside his preferred frame of reference. 9 Finally, General Petraeus is not afraid to take prudent risks. Two examples illustrate this characteristic. The first was when he took command of the 101 st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and was preparing the division to deploy to Iraq. Knowing that the deployment order was imminent and that he would have difficulty getting the division's equipment, particularly its helicopters, to the port of embarkation on time if he waited for the order, on his own initiative he sent all of the division's helicopters on a "cross-country training exercise" that just happened to terminate in Jacksonville, Florida, their point of departure. He also did a rail load-out exercise for the lead brigade at Fort Campbell, got the port in Jacksonville opened, and started shrink-wrapping his helicopters, all as part of the "exercise. " When the deployment order came down from the Secretary of Defense through U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) a few days later with a seemingly impossible deployment date (as he had anticipated), he was able to report to the surprised FORSCOM commander that he would meet his deployment deadlines without any difficulty since his helicopters were already at the port and being prepared for shipment. 10 General Petraeus's decision to send his helicopters to Jacksonville on his own authority was risky and illustrated his mantra: "In the absence of guidance or orders, figure out what they should have been and execute accordingly. "
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The second example of General Petraeus's willingness to take risks is recounted in a case study written at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard entitled "The Accidental States- One of the first impacts General Petraeus had was on the tempo of operations in MNF-I.
Wherever he took command, the pace seemed to noticeably pick up, and MNF-I was no exception. Part of the change in tempo was due to his high personal energy level-he tends to infuse an organization with energy. That is no accident, as General Petraeus believes energizing others is one of a commander's mandates. 18 He wants to make things happen, and happen rapidly. One of his challenges, in fact, is not to move too fast but to take time for reflection when making important decisions. 19 In MNF-I, the more rapid pace was immediately apparent in the daily "battlefield update assessment, " a briefing for the general and the MNF-I staff and senior commanders that involved a classified intelligence assessment and that guided daily operations and priorities. This briefing was attended by some MNF-I staff and commanders and broadcast to others throughout Iraq by secure video teleconference (VTC). General Petraeus used this daily briefing both to get himself rapidly up to speed and to make his influence felt in guiding and directing what was going on throughout Iraq.
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One example of General Petraeus's personal impact was the case of the notorious Tower 57, a damaged electrical power tower that had been inoperable for months. When the status of Tower 57 was briefed at one of his first daily assessments, instead of letting it go by without comment as had happened in the past, General Petraeus stopped the briefing and asked why it had been inoperable for so long. The reply was that it could not be repaired because it was in an unsecure area with a high threat of terrorist attack. The general's reaction was that he could not control many things, but one thing he could do was to ensure adequate security for Tower 57.
The Surge
Once security was improved, it finally took a letter to Prime Minister Maliki to prod the Iraqi electrical ministry into action, but Tower 57 eventually came back online. The effect on the MNF-I staff was significant. With that one action, General Petraeus demonstrated that it was not "business as usual" and that he would not be satisfied with people telling him why something could not be done; he expected his subordinates to tell him how they were making things happen and solving problems, and he would not let up until the problem was solved. At the briefing when Tower 57's status was finally reported as online and operational, cheers could be heard from the staff listening to the briefing via VTC. 21 General Petraeus believed in establishing as flat an organization as he could and in using a hands-off leadership approach. Early on, he told subordinates, "I don't need to be hierarchical. 
Knowlton
The decision of whether to take an "enemy-centric" or a "population-centric" approach was one of the most important and difficult decisions General Petraeus had to make. 35 The general has long believed in "big ideas . . . the right intellectual constructs to guide one's approach or strategy. " In his words, "strategic leadership is fundamentally about big ideas and about four tasks connected with those big ideas: first, getting the big ideas right; second, communicating them effectively; third, ensuring that they are executed properly; and fourth, capturing, sharing, and institutionalizing lessons learned and best practices identified during the execution of those big ideas. " 36 The most important big idea that guided his strategy in Iraq was that securing the Iraqi population must be preeminent-that without security for the population, military operations against insurgents would bring only temporary gains at best. General Odierno agreed, recommending to Petraeus that their top priority be to "secure the Iraqi people, with a focus on Baghdad. " 37 As the commander of the newly formed Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B)
stated, "We are very good at clearing areas, but that does not count for anything unless you hold it afterwards. " 38 General Petraeus recognized that unless U.S. or Iraqi forces could hold and retain cleared areas, they could not secure the population and insurgents would just move back into areas after the coalition forces moved on.
The implementation of this big idea-securing the population-was through the Baghdad security plan, which had been formulated and begun to be implemented before General Petraeus returned to Iraq, although it was not formally launched until after he took command in Feb- The Surge A key part of the plan was the necessity for the military force to get out of the large base camps. 42 As General Petraeus put it:
[We] realized we couldn't adequately secure the people by commuting to the fight. 
The Political Strategy
Even before he returned to Iraq, however, General Petraeus had come to the conclusion that there needed to be "a surge in four areas: not just the military, but also the civilian side of the U.S. government, the Iraqi forces, and Iraqi political will. " 45 JSAT also recognized that the strategy for the war involved much more than just a military strategy, and in addition to their recommendation "to apply a military strategy of protecting the population and attacking those who would not come to the [negotiating] The broader political strategy that encompassed these additional four recommendations
would prove far more difficult to formulate and implement than the military strategy described above. One of the obvious challenges with developing and implementing a political strategy was that it is traditionally the role of the State Department, not the Defense Department.
The Petraeus-Crocker Team
The ability to surmount the U.S. intragovernmental challenges in Iraq was dependent on how well General Petraeus was able to work with the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. Both General
Petraeus and the United States were fortunate that Ryan Crocker became the U.S. Ambassador in late March 2007, less than 2 months after the general assumed command. Ambassador
Crocker was first of all probably the most experienced diplomat in the region, having served as Ambassador to Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria, and Pakistan prior to his appointment to Iraq.
He was fluent in Arabic and had decades of service in the Middle East. Crocker was astute enough to recognize that although he was formally in charge of the diplomatic and political aspects of U.S. policy in Iraq, the U.S. military wielded enormous influence and power-both because of the sheer size of its budget and presence in Iraq and also because of Petraeus's stature and personality.
Fortunately, both leaders recognized that they would need to work together to succeed. To this end, they worked hard to coordinate their schedules and personally met on an almost daily basis. Their personalities complemented each other. Petraeus liked to take the lead in almost any area, using his energy and drive to make things happen. Crocker often exerted his influence in a more subtle way, and did not fight Petraeus for control, a power struggle that would have been detrimental for all concerned. Neither was the Ambassador intimidated by the general's confident and energetic manner. Petraeus had tremendous respect for Crocker's intellect and greater experience in the Middle East, and their mutual admiration allowed them to forge a strong bond. Crocker frequently used his calm and even manner to smooth relations with the Iraqis, while Petraeus was more likely to push Iraqi leaders, including Prime Minister Maliki, for action, demonstrating a range of emotions and occasionally exaggerating his emotional reaction when he believed it was necessary-although the two did take turns being the "bad cop" on occasion. 47 Both leaders were absolutely committed to "unity of effort" if not unity of command, and The importance of the close personal relationship between Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus cannot be overemphasized, and without it, the United States probably would not have had a coordinated and united political-military strategy and effort in Iraq. Moreover, the situation demanded such a strategy because establishing security, the essential precondition for progress, was as much political as military, and perhaps more so.
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Iraqi Political Dynamics
The political situation was extremely complex and almost unfathomable to those without first-hand knowledge and experience in Iraq. The largest political groups were the three major ethnosectarian groups: the Sunni, Shiites, and Kurds. The Kurds dominated the north, the Sunnis were most prevalent in the middle of the country, and Shiites were predominant in the south. The Shiites were the largest of these groups, but they had been repressed for decades 
Buying Time
One major problem that Petraeus and Crocker faced was managing expectations in Washington. Political reconciliation among Iraq's leaders and their various groups and factions was incredibly difficult to achieve, and things did not progress or move as rapidly as they wanted or as the President and Congress expected. As Petraeus stated, "The Washington clock was moving much faster than the Baghdad clock." 56 Petraeus's solution to slow down the Washington clock was to make national reconciliation a long-term but "distant" goal of the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) and to focus on a local level, measuring progress in terms of security gains and reductions in violence in specific localized areas in Baghdad and across the country. Over time, as more and more local areas achieved higher levels of security and decreased levels of violence, these "pockets of local security" could be linked, leading to "sustainable security" nationwide, and then to national reconciliation. By not even putting a target date on national reconciliation, the JCP made that a "generational goal" and eliminated expectations that Iraq would reach that goal for years to come. This also shifted the long-term goal from a military victory resulting in some kind of formal surrender of the enemy forces to a series of negotiated agreements for things such as sharing power and resources and national governance.
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One tool General Petraeus used to great effect in managing expectations in Washington and elsewhere was the media. Petraeus is the exception to the common military view of the media as adversaries who can do no good but only harm. 58 In his view, providing open access to the media would allow him to get his message out and influence perceptions and expectations rather than reacting to what was printed or said without his input. In his dealings with the media in Iraq, he tried to be positive in highlighting accomplishments but realistic in acknowledging setbacks or lack of rapid progress, and he did the same in congressional hearings, another important venue for influencing public opinion. 59 As Rob- 
Achieving Local Successes in Baghdad
The experiences of U.S. Army units in two key areas of Baghdad are recounted at some length in Linda Robinson's book and serve to illustrate how difficult and costly it was to achieve the "pockets of local security" that were the short-term objectives of the JCP. The experience of the 1/26 IR in Adhamiya clarified a number of things. First, it would require a lot of troops, both U.S. and Iraqi, to bring security to Baghdad. Related to this point, the Iraqi troops who were fighting alongside the Americans had to be willing to fight Shia militias as well as Sunni insurgents, and if they allied themselves with the Shia militias, they exacerbated the problem rather than helping solve it. Second, securing the population could not be purely defensive but offensive as well. Insurgents had to be killed or captured, but "collateral damage" in the form of civilian casualties had to be minimized or the end result would be creating more insurgents than had been killed. Finally, the Sunni insurgents would keep fighting as long as they believed the Shia-dominated Iraqi government was out to kill Sunnis or drive them out of their homes. A lasting peace would require significant changes at the national level. 63 This was Petraeus's conundrum: local gains were required to push along national reconciliation, but lasting local gains were impossible without progress toward reconciliation at the national level. 
Robinson's summary of the significance of what happened in Ameriya follows:
Kuehl and his battalion had accomplished an amazing turnaround in Ameriya.
They had implemented the full gamut of counterinsurgency tactics, including skillful diplomacy that had won the confidence of the local leaders and population and cemented an alliance with indigenous fighters. They had exploited all of this for intelligence to target and diminish the enemy forces, and had begun to revive the neighborhood's economic, political, and social life. The battalions and brigades had created facts on the ground that could be used as levers to move the national leaders forward. But it remained to be seen whether their local success would
hold, and whether it would help catalyze wider progress. The tide had turned militarily. The next step was to continue the movement toward national reconciliation.
National Reconciliation (Continued)
General Petraeus continued to devote much of his effort to the "bottom-up" approach of using local gains to push national reconciliation. The best example of that approach outside from Baghdad, at least initially. 70 Second, he implemented the policy without notifying President George W. Bush. Petraeus's response when questioned about not getting the President's approval is telling: "I don't think it was something that we need to ask permission for. We had the authority to conduct what are called security contracts, and that was how we saw these. But to be truthful, Clearly, the President's support was assured. However, there was another key stakeholder whose support was not at all assured. Petraeus would have a much harder time convincing Congress of the success of the surge strategy.
In the Hot Seat: Testifying Before Congress
Even before General Petraeus testified before Congress, his credibility was being attacked in the media by a number of sources. Some questioned Petraeus's assertions about progress being made in Iraq, some questioned the facts and metrics he was using to support his conclusions, and some questioned his integrity and suggested that he was distorting facts to suit his own ends. The most direct of these personal attacks was a large opinion piece in the New York Iraq's problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions.
And though we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating consequences. " General Petraeus portrayed it, and some interpreted her comment on "the willing suspension of disbelief " to indicate that she questioned General Petraeus's credibility and integrity. 94 Other
Senators, including Barack Obama and Joseph Biden, expressed reservations about General
Petraeus's assessment and conclusions.
In spite of what could be described as a hostile atmosphere, throughout the hours of hearings General Petraeus demonstrated incredible self-control and an ability to conceal any affective reaction to the comments being made. His demeanor never changed even when the comments amounted to personal attacks. Petraeus's ability throughout the hearings to "keep his cool" was perhaps as important as the content of his assessment in delivering his message, and some viewers compared his performance favorably with that of the Senators and Members of Congress questioning him. 95 There was another group that Petraeus and Crocker had to report to and convince that it was not time to give up in Iraq: the American people. In keeping with their philosophy that engagement with the media was the best way to ensure that their views got out and that it was better to be seen and heard expressing their views than to have media commentators stating what they had heard, Petraeus and Crocker gave numerous media interviews after each day's hearings, some running late into the evening. One count had Petraeus giving 23 interviews during his short time in Washington. 96 The end result of Petraeus and Crocker's visit to Washington was mixed. Many people still believed that the war in Iraq was lost and that the United States should withdraw its forces as rapidly as possible-indeed, their views had not changed. However, General Petraeus's and Ambassador Crocker's performance during the hearings received generally favorable reviews, and they were successful in controlling the size and speed of the drawdown of U.S. forces until at least March 2008. Buying the time to continue the surge strategy was no small accomplishment and gave them 6 more months to achieve the progress on political reconciliation that so far had been elusive. 
The Tide Gradually Turns
Maliki Takes a High-risk Gamble
In March 2008, Prime Minister Maliki made a decision that had significant consequences. Faced with increasing violence and lawlessness in Basra, the major city in Shiite-dominated southern Iraq, he decided to lead a poorly planned, hasty attack to roust out the militias and "criminal elements" there and restore order. This was a total surprise to Petraeus, who, along with Maliki's national security advisors and security ministers, had just been briefed on a deliberate plan to retake Basra in 3 to 4 months. Maliki's military commanders told him that it would be an easy victory, and he decided to launch the attack in 2 days and to personally direct the operation.
From the U.S. perspective, prospects were not good, and the situation in Baghdad was poor with over a dozen rocket attacks daily on the Green Zone, the U.S. and Iraqi government safe-haven in Baghdad, from Sadr City-the part of Baghdad controlled by the Moqtada alSadr and the JAM, who also were the major source of violence in Basra. As feared, at first the government attack looked like a disaster in the making, but on the fifth or sixth day, the momentum turned as Petraeus and the new Multi-National Corps-Iraq commander, Lieutenant
General Lloyd Austin, shifted U.S. assets to support the fight in Basra, and Sadr called on his militia to stand down and discontinue attacks. A cease-fire followed with fighting dying out by early April. Petraeus viewed this as a clear-cut military victory; Sadr's militia was destroyed and control of Basra and its ports was taken back by the government. 106 The attack in Basra totally changed almost everyone's opinion of Maliki. From being perceived as a weak politician, Maliki almost overnight became seen as a strong and decisive leader for all Iraqis who was willing to take on and whip Shiite militias. To many more Iraqis, siding with Maliki rather than Sadr looked like a good decision.
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Another Challenge for Petraeus
The next challenge for General Petraeus came in March 2008 when he was due to make his recommendations on the pace of the decrease of military forces in Iraq to the President and Congress. Petraeus believed that it was critical to keep 15 Brigade Combat Teams in Iraq until September, while most of his superiors were pushing for a more rapid decrease to 10 brigades. 108 Petraeus knew that he held a trump card, which was the direct communication channel that President Bush had established with him-and the President's willingness to use it. Bush had met with Petraeus and Crocker in Kuwait in January and made it clear that he would support keeping the troop levels they believed they needed. He had then stated to the press, "My attitude is, if [Petraeus] didn't want to continue the drawdown, that's fine with me, in order to make sure we succeed. I said to the general, 'If you want to slow her down, fine; it's up to you. '" 109 With that kind of support from the President, General Petraeus knew he would be likely to prevail on troop levels, and that happened in April when President Bush accepted Petraeus's recommendations to keep troop levels at 15 brigades while also recognizing the stress that would put on the Army and Marine Corps by directing that the tour length for military units be reduced from 15 to 12 months by August. 110 Petraeus's stature was boosted further when his direct boss, Admiral Fallon, the USCENT-COM commander, was forced to retire after publication of an article in which he appeared to come out against administration policy. Petraeus was not involved in the article or the issues that got Fallon in trouble, but it was well known that Fallon and Petraeus had disagreed on U.S. policy in Iraq, and
Fallon's abrupt departure was seen as a positive development for Petraeus (even more so when the general was later selected to replace the admiral as USCENTCOM commander). 111 Petraeus found that getting his recommendations up to the President was much less difficult in the spring of 2008 than in the previous fall, and that Fallon and the Joint Chiefs were relatively supportive of his recommendations even though they favored a more rapid drawdown than Petraeus did. 112 Petraeus's reception when testifying before Congress in early April 2008 also was considerably more favorable than it had been in the previous September, and he believed that without the recent fighting in Basra and Sadr City that his testimony would have been "very straightforward. " 113 As it was, he still faced tough questioning about the duration, cost, and extent of the U.S. commitment and some skepticism as to how lasting the gains would be. Petraeus was clear about his assessment of the situation in his prepared testimony before Congress:
Since Ambassador Crocker and I appeared before you seven months ago, there has been significant but uneven security progress in Iraq. Since September, levels 114 Petraeus made no predictions about the future in his prepared testimony, and when asked when the war would be over, he replied that it depended on how and when the Iraqis resolved the ongoing struggle for power and control of resources and the various factions decided to work together. 
